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Abstract
The Fuji apple variety is relatively new in the U.S.  As a new product, questions concern the
relative impact of consumer learning by experience, by variety-specific promotion, or by generic
apple promotion.  A two-stage (LES/LAIDS) model incorporating both types of promotion is
used to estimate the effect of generic and variety specific promotion, as well as consumer
experience, on the demand for Fuji apples.  Estimates show each to have a positive impact, and
also show new or specialty apple varieties to be relatively price inelastic, but income elastic. 
Grower returns to promotion are calculated with an equilibrium displacement model of price
changes and producer surplus.  Changes in producer surplus provide a base-scenario benefit:cost
ratio of 14.73.
keywords: apple demand, experience, LAIDS, new products, producer surplus, promotion,
varieties. 
1 For purposes of this paper, “generic” promotion consists of Washington Apple Commission (WAC)
marketing expenditure designed to establish the image of Washington apples in general, whereas variety-specific
promotion is that amount of expenditure that can be identified as emphasizing the particular traits of one variety. 
“Mature” apple varieties include Red Delicious, Golden Delicious, and Granny Smith.  Production of these
varieties has been stable for many years.
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New Varieties and the Returns to Commodity Promotion: Washington Fuji Apples
Introduction
Calendar year 1997 was the “Year of the Fuji.”  The Fuji is an apple variety noted for its sweet
taste and crisp texture, and is the leading variety in many Asia markets, particularly Japan, Korea,
and China.  Developed in Japan in 1958, growers in Washington state began growing Fujis in
1990.  With nearly 11,000 bearing acres, Fujis now represent the third largest variety in terms of
acreage in the state, surpassing even the Granny Smith.  Faced with marketing production that has
increased from virtually nothing at the beginning of the decade, to 3.1 million cartons in 1995-96,
and to 6.9 million in 1996-97, Washington apple growers, through the Washington Apple
Commission (WAC), recognize the need for a Fuji-specific promotional campaign.  This variety-
specific focus is relatively unique among commodity promoters because, in many respects, it
represents an attempt to establish a brand identity for what is usually regarded as a homogeneous
commodity.
Consequently, there was some concern that this type of program would be as effective as
previous generic-promotion efforts (Ward, 1993).1  Apple varieties are like brands in that they
identify a subset of a product category whose members are likely to share more characteristics in
common with each other than other members of the category.  To the extent that variety-
advertising is able to build and reinforce a favorable impression of these characteristics among
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consumers, then it is likely to be effective.  However, there is some question of the viability of
variety-specific promotion when quality from year-to-year is difficult to control, when many
producers sell the same variety, and given evidence in the trade-press indicating that consumers
are not likely to consider variety in their apple choice (The Packer, 1996).  Like most fruits and
vegetables, in this sense apples are experience goods, so purely informative promotion is not
likely to be as effective as promotion designed to induce trial purchases and to build reputation. 
Once consumers buy a certain type of apple, their experience and word-of-mouth may be enough
to establish a market for the variety.  As a result, growers are justifiably concerned over the
economic viability of promoting Fujis.
Therefore, the critical problems facing growers and WAC marketing officials lie in
determining the relative rates of return to generic and variety-specific promotion, and in
determining whether new varieties respond differently to promotion than mature varieties.  Will a
new variety benefit more from an established brand name strengthened through repeated generic
advertising programs that focus on expanding demand for the apple category, or through variety-
specific promotion that emphasizes the unique characteristics of a new variety?  This question
goes beyond apples as other commodity marketers seek to introduce new varieties to the market -
varieties that are difficult to brand, yet are in fact significantly different from established and
accepted products. 
Consequently, the objective of this research is to determine the return to Washington
apple growers’ investments in generic and variety-specific promotion.  In order to determine
grower returns to each type of promotion, this paper develops a model of the Washington apple
market that considers several features of retail demand and FOB-price determination: the role of
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consumer experience in demand growth, the dynamics of generic and variety-specific promotion,
inter-variety substitution and complementarity effects, and the effect of market structure on retail-
FOB price transmission.  Each of these issues may significantly impact the viability of a grower-
funded promotion program.
First, all products are to differing degrees search or experience goods (Nelson).  Whereas
purely informative advertising is not likely to be effective for experience goods, it is necessary
when consumers’ incur considerable costs in searching for a product that meets their needs. 
Moreover, the relative importance of search and experience, or learning, differs between new and
established varieties (Day).  As a product moves along its life cycle of growth, maturity, and
decline, search activities become less important than momentum built from past sales.  Second,
the dynamics of promotion vary with a product’s life cycle (Little).  Third, if varieties are
considered close substitutes by consumers, then variety-specific promotion is likely to have a
cannibalistic effect on other varieties - varieties that are often grown by the same sellers of the
new variety.  However, if generic promotion is effective in growing the demand for apples in
total, then such synergistic or brand image effects may indeed be beneficial to growers of all
varieties.  Even if promotion results in a positive response in retail demand, this does not
necessarily mean growers benefit if there are intervening factors between retail and FOB prices. 
In particular, FOB prices will be higher in relation to domestic retail prices the greater the
share of production that moves into premium export markets.  Margins for specialty produce also
depend upon their maturity as a product.  Initially, growers of a superior new variety will have
some ability to command premium prices -- an advantage that disappears with maturity and
increased production by other growers.  Further, retail-farm margins for various farm products
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have been shown to be dependent upon many other factors beyond grower control, such as
quality characteristics (Parker and Zilberman), market power (Sexton, Durham and Sexton,
Powers 1991), sluggishness of price-transmission (Shonkwiler and Taylor, Powers 1995), or
whether retail prices are increasing or decreasing (Ward 1982, Kinnucan and Forker).  Models
designed to calculate the return to apple promotion should consider each of these factors.
The paper proceeds by describing one such model of Fuji apple promotion - a Muth-type
Equilibrium Displacement (MED) market-model that takes into account retail demand, price-
transmission, grower supply and market equilibrium.   The second section presents the empirical
models used to trace the effect of promotion from sales of all Washington apples, to specific
varieties, and finally to FOB prices through a FOB-price linkage equation.  The third section
describes the data used to estimate and simulate the model, and explains the specific econometric
methods involved.  A fourth section presents the results from each stage of the analysis.  A final
section summarizes these results and presents some implications, limitations, and suggestions for
future research.
A Conceptual Model of Washington Apple Promotion
For the purposes of this study, grower-returns to promotion are defined in terms of the net
present value of a change in producer surplus resulting from a change in promotion expenditure,
relative to promotion costs.  Although the effects occur simultaneously, the model is best
described in stages.  First, a change in promotion spending causes a change in demand at the retail
level to an extent measured by the promotion-response elasticity.  Second, the change in FOB
price in response to this change in demand is determined by the price-transmission elasticity - or
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d lnQr ' Nrd lnP % Gd lnZr % B1d lnA1 % B2 d lnA2; (1)
d lnQx ' Nxd lnP % Hd lnZx ; (2)
d lnX ' Esd lnW ; (3)
d lnW ' Td lnP ; (4)
the responsiveness of FOB prices to retail price changes.  Third, once filtered down to the FOB
level, this change in demand causes a change in both the equilibrium quantity and price, as
handlers respond to the higher price by bringing a greater supply to the market.  Ultimately, the
increase in demand has a greater effect on price the lower the assumed elasticity of packer supply. 
Fourth, once a new equilibrium is achieved, producer surplus will be higher to the extent that both
price and output are higher than before the promotion.  To calculate the change in producer
surplus, this study requires a model of the Fuji market equilibrium.
For this purpose, changes in producer surplus are found using a simplified version of the
Muth Equilibrium Displacement (MED) model (Kinnucan et al. 1995).  This model solves for the
simultaneous impact of a change in promotion expenditure on retail demand, export demand, FOB
price, farm supply, and, ultimately, producer surplus.  As interest lies in the response of each
market variable to a change in promotion, all variables are expressed in terms of log-differentials. 
With this simplification, each parameter in the market model is an elasticity.  Specifically, the
partial equilibrium Fuji market model consists of equations representing retail demand:
export demand:
farm supply:
price transmission:
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wx d lnQx % wr d lnQr ' d lnX; (5)
)PS ' j
i
S fi Pi Qid lnWi(1 % 0.5d lnXi). (6)
d lnP ' M&1 Gd lnZr % M
&1 Hd lnZx % M
&1 B1 d lnA1 % M
&1 B2 d lnA2 , (7)
and market equilibrium:
while changes in producer surplus are expressed as,
W is a vector of FOB variety prices; X  is a vector of variety supplies; P is a vector of variety
market prices (assuming for simplicity sake that export and retail prices are equal, or differ by
some constant of proportionality that can be normalized to 1.0 without loss of generality); Qr is a
corresponding vector of retail quantities; Qx is a vector of export quantities;  wr s the share of
production sold at retail; wx s the share sold as export; Si
f is the grower’s share of the retail dollar
for the ith variety; Zr and Zx are exogenous demand shifters in the retail and export markets,
respectively; A1 is the amount of Fuji-specific promotion; and A2 is the amount of generic WAC
promotion expenditure.  With respect to the model parameters, Nr nd Nx are matrices of retail
and export demand price-elasticities, respectively; Bk are matrices of promotion elasticities for the
kth type of promotion; T is a vector of price-transmission elasticities; G is a matrix of demand
elasticities with respect to exogenous retail factors, H is a matrix of elasticities with respect to
exogenous export demand shifters; and Es is the matrix of supply response elasticities.  The
elements in (1) - (6) are solved simultaneously for the change in retail price by substituting (4)
into (3) and combining (1) and (2) into (5).  Simplifying the result then provides a reduced form
expression for the change in retail price in response to a change in either type of promotion or the
other exogenous factors, such as consumer experience or apple expenditure:
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where:  The resulting change in market price is then used toM ' Es T & wd Nd & wx Nx .
calculate the change in FOB price (4) and shipper supply through (3) and the change in producer
surplus through (6).   Comparing the present value of changes in producer surplus to the present
value of the cost of its provision provides an estimate of the returns to promotion, expressed in
terms of a present value benefit:cost ratio.  
Kinnucan et al. describe three assumptions that may effect the accuracy of (6) as a
measure of producer surplus.  First, it assumes “...parallel shifts in linear demand schedules...” but
“...the approximation error is probably negligible if the equilibrium displacements being
considered are small...” (Kinnucan, et al p. 91).  Second, the grower-assessment used to finance
apple promotions is likely to shift the supply curve backward, causing some substitution to other
crops.  Third, if supply is not fixed, then some of the assessment incidence lies on apple
consumers.  To the extent that this tax-shift occurs, the surplus measure in (6) understates actual
returns to promotion.  The following section develops a two-stage model of consumer demand
that is used to estimate the elasticities used in this simulation, incorporating promotion both at the
category and variety levels.
A Two-Stage Model of Fuji Demand and Promotion
There are several reasons why a two-stage model of demand is particularly useful in evaluating
the effectiveness of promotion expenditures.  First, efforts to increase demand can change both
the demand for an entire category, or just reallocate spending among specific products within the
category (Duffy).  While specific efforts may be made in promoting a particular variety of apple,
consumers often fail to identify varieties or brands of any type in fresh produce (Patterson, et al.)
so these efforts tend to spillover or affect the demand for related products.   Second, generic
messages intended to increase total apple category sales will have different effects on the sales of
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each variety.  Once a consumer makes a decision to buy within the apple category, variety choice
is ultimately made on factors perceived within the store at the time of purchase, independent of
the general information provided by a generic ad.  Third, these interaction effects may reduce the
total value of category sales.  Retailers in particular have cause for concern when promotion
causes consumers to switch from high-margin to low-margin apples without a corresponding
increase in category volume.  Determining these effects requires a model of both category and
variety demand.
To be consistent with the requirements of consumer utility-maximization, this study uses a
two-stage budget allocation model.  This approach assumes consumers allocate a fixed amount of
income in the first-stage between apples, various other fruits, and all other consumer goods, while
they allocate apple expenditure among varieties at the second-stage.  Hausman uses a similar
approach in estimating the demand for categories and brands of ready-to-eat cereal.  Many studies
of commodity promotion also use this approach to differentiate between first- and second-stage
promotion effects (Goddard and Tielu, Goddard and Amuah, Richards, van Ispelen and Kagan).
Modeling the entire budgeting decision as a multi-stage process has many advantages over
the alternative in that it allows for the specification of a more complete demand system, does not
suffer from specification errors caused by considering each stage in isolation, and permits nested
tests of the generic and variety effects of promotion.  However, these advantages come at a cost
of imposing a very specific structure on the demand model.  Specifically, Gorman demonstrates
that two-stage models can only be consistent with utility maximization by assuming preferences
are homothetically separable, or that they are strongly separable into sub-branches that are of
generalized Gorman polar form.  Because the first alternative imposes the untenable restriction
that each element of the variety (lower stage) model has unitary expenditure elasticities, this study
adopts the latter.  Examples of this approach include Brown and Heien, Blackorby, et al., Yen and
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XI ' PI QI(P,Y) ' QIPI % #I Y & j
J
QJ PJ , (8)
MI ' 1 % 2I(A
(
I /PI)lnPI , (9)
XI ' PIQI ' PIQI % 2IQIA
(
I % #I Y & j
J
QJPJ . (10)
Roe, and Gao, Wailes, and Cramer.  Specifying a demand system consistent with these restrictions
also means that the price indices at the upper level are perfect price indices for each sub-group, so
estimating the entire system through the iterative process of Anderson provides consistent
estimates of both the structural and promotion elasticities at each level.  One specification that
meets these restrictions consists of an upper stage Linear Expenditure System (LES) and a lower
stage Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS). 
Deaton and Muellbauer provide a derivation of the LES model which this paper extends to
include promotion.  Using upper case letters to denote the upper, or category, level of demand,
the basic LES becomes:
where XI, is the expenditure on category I, Y is per capita income, PI is a price index defined over
the components of category I, %I is the marginal budget share, and QI measures the subsistence
amount of expenditure on good I.  P llak and Wales suggest including other arguments of the
utility function as scaling factors, or variables that cause the effective price faced by consumers to
vary by their exposure to advertising.   Defining the scaling function as:
multiplying prices in the expenditure function underlying (8) and re-deriving the demand system
leads to an upper-level demand model similar to Chang and Green:
2 Feichtinger, Hartl, and Sethi provide a comprehensive categorization of theoretical and empirical
rationales for modeling the dynamic effects of promotion into models of promotion as a capital stock, models of
dynamic sales-responsiveness, market growth models, multiple state-variable models that allow for cumulative
purchase, or experience effects, and models of dynamic oligopoly promotion-games. 
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For this equation to be part of a system of demand equations that is consistent with constrained
utility maximization, all  and .  As Ehrlich and Fisher argue,#I $ 0, j #I ' 1, QI $ QI  I
advertising (AI
* in (10)) should be considered as an accumulated stock because consumers tend to
acquire information only gradually over time.  By the same token, however, consumers tend to
forget past advertising messages after they are taken from the air or the newspaper.  These
competing effects suggests an explicit consideration of the dynamic effects of advertising’s
growth and decay.
Often, advertising is treated as contributing to a consumer’s stock of knowledge regarding
a category of products.  Similar to a physical asset owned by a firm, akin to goodwill or brand
equity (Nerlove and Arrow), this knowledge depreciates slowly over time as it is forgotten,
becomes obsolete as new products come to the market (Kotler), or is superceded by strategic
promotions from oligopolistic rivals (Erickson, Sorger).  Further, promotion carryover may arise
for several other reasons: a threshold level of knowledge may be required before purchase
initiation occurs, patterns of brand loyalty take time to establish, habits may require repeated
efforts to break (Chang), or simply that the process of disseminating information is not
instantaneous.2   Irrespective of the rationalization, defining promotion as a capital asset implies
that the current amount of  AI
* is a distributed lag of previous investments: 
where b(i) are lag-weights.  Similar considerations for promotion carryoverA (I ' j
i
b(i)At&i ,
enter the second-stage model.
At the second, or variety-demand stage, a linear Almost Ideal Demand System (LAIDS)
satisfies the requirement for two-stage budgeting in that the implied preferences are of Gorman
polar form (Deaton and Muellbauer).  Blanciforti and Green summarize the advantages and
3 Although retail prices are endogneous in the aggregate market model, the disaggregate demand system
is estimated with weekly data in local markets where prices are more likely to be predetermined. Moreover,
Hausman tests fail to reject exogeneity of variety price.  
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wi ' "i % j
j
(ij ln(pj) % $i ln(XA/PA), (11)
wi ' "i % j
j
(ij lnpj & j
j
(ij*j lnA
(
j % $i ln(XA/PA), (12)
limitations of estimating demand with this form of the AIDS model, while many authors
demonstrate its ability to provide plausible estimates of the effect of promotion on demand.  In the
current case, the share of each apple variety becomes:
where wi, is the share of variety i (piqi/XA); pi is the price of variety i; XA is the amount of
expenditure on the A commodity sub-group, and ln PA is a Stone price index for this group such
that ln .   Scaling prices in the AIDS expenditure function by the functionPA ' j
i
wilnpi,
and applying Shephard’s Lemma leads to promotion-augmented share equations ofmi(A
(
i ) ' A
*i(
i
the form:
where Aj
* is a vector of variety-specific promotion stocks.3  Baye, Jansen, and Lee describe the
usual set of parametric restrictions to ensure symmetry, homogeneity, and adding-up extended to
include scaling.  While (12) is a common specification for the effects of promotion on demand,
consumers also obtain product knowledge from sources other than advertising.  Particularly for
new varieties of a mature product, such knowledge can be acquired by search or experience
(Nelson).
Experience is especially important for goods whose characteristics are difficult to convey,
and highly variable - even items that are the same variety and from the same source (Lilien and
Kotler).  Therefore, accumulated consumption of a new product may also explain much of the
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,i '
(ii
wi
& $i %
$i
wi
% 1
QI wi PI
XI
1 & #I & 1.0, (13)
increase in demand typical of the growth stage in the life cycle of a new product -- through both
consumers’ self discovery and through knowledge gained by word-of-mouth, or learning from
others (McFadden and Train).  The notion of a product life cycle implies that information from
experience and promotion are likely to have different effects on the demand for mature and new
varieties.  New apple varieties are likely to spend some time in the introductory phase, where
promotion that generates awareness and initiates first-purchase will be most effective, but the
stock of consumer experience will be small.  As a variety becomes established and its
characteristics well known, more variety-specific promotion aimed at differentiating it from other
types of apples is expected to prove more important than purchase experience.  Promotion at this
stage should seek to encourage habit formation among consumers that have tried the variety. 
Varieties in the late-maturity and decline phases, however, benefit more from price-promotions
and discounting (Belch and Belch).  By allowing each share intercept to vary with cumulative
consumption: the variety demand model incorporates an indicator of"i ' "
(
0i % "
(
1ij
T
t'0
Qt ,
consumption experience, or stage of the product life cycle.  Failing to include the effect of
consumption experience would likely lead to estimates that overstate the role of both prices and
promotion in increasing variety demand.
Combining estimates of the first- and second-stage demand parameters leads to elasticities
of variety sales with respect to prices and promotion that take into account both the category and
variety response, so the total price elasticity of demand is written as:
and the cross price elasticity:
4 To simplify the marketing channel to only two players, all agents beyond the grower are included in one
“middleman” designation.  Middlemen’s interest lies in obtaining a high retail price, while keeping FOB prices as
low as possible.  
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,i,Ai '
*i
wi
1 & $i lnpi %
$i
wi
% 1
2iA
(
i
XI
. (15)
and the total long-run promotion elasticity is written as:
In calculating these elasticities, prices, budget shares, promotion-stock amounts, and expenditure
levels in (13) - (15) are each evaluated at their respective means.  Although these elasticities
indicate the responsiveness of retail apple sales to changes in prices, promotion, and expenditure,
changes in producer surplus depend upon the FOB price transmission elasticity.
Whereas other studies use synthetic price transmission elasticities (for example, Kinnucan,
et al.), this study estimates this elasticity using a reduced-form marketing margin equation derived
from a model of optimal shipper behavior.  Factors that explain the difference between FOB and
retail prices include labor and transportation costs, export-market price premiums, or the premium
initially due to Fujis’ status as a new variety in relatively limited supply.  Further, differences
between retail and orchard prices may arise if there are lags in the adjustment of FOB prices to
changes in retail demand.  Wohlgenant and Mullen describe a model of the retail-farm price
margin in which the difference in price is due to a derived demand for marketing services by
middlemen.  In the current example, the profit maximization problem faced by a representative
apple distributor is written as:4
5 Export premiums are possible due to the successful differentiation of Washington apples from others on
world markets.  As a result, Washington apple growers have some ability to price discriminate between the
domestic and off-shore markets.
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maxq rBi ' maxq r [(p
r & kp f)q r & c(w,q r)], (16)
p f( ' (p r /k) 1 % ,d %
q x
q r
2&1x %
q o
q r
2&1o &
Mc
Mq r
. (17)
where qr is the retail quantity; pr is the retail price; pf is the FOB price; k is a constant of
proportionality representing shrinkage and loss from the orchard to the store, and c(w, qr ) is the
cost of selling apples with input prices, w.  B cause apple distributors have the option of buying
Fujis for domestic sale, or for export sale (qx ), or other more established varieties (qo), he FOB
price is a function of the relative demand for each:  If the proportion ofp f ' f(q r,q x,q o).
exported to total apples rises, then FOB prices are likely to rise due to the premium earned from
off-shore sales.5  On the other hand, a rise in domestic Fuji sales relative to existing varieties is
likely to mean the erosion of the new product premium commanded by Fujis in the past.  Defining
,d as the retail elasticity of demand for Fujis; ,x as the elasticity of export demand with respect to
the FOB price, ,; as the elasticity of demand for other; mature apple varieties; 2x as th
conjectural variation of export demand with respect to retail demand ; 2o(dq x /dq r)
as the conjectural variation of mature variety sales with respect to Fuji retail sales, aggregating
over a homogeneous set of distributors provides a solution to (16) at the market level:
Although this shows how FOB prices are ideally linked to retail prices, marketing costs, and
quantities that flow into alternative markets, farm prices rarely respond instantaneously to changes
in retail prices (Heien, Ward, 1982, Kinnucan and Forker, Powers, 1995). 
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p ft ' $(1 & 8)Mt % 8p
f
t&1 % et . (18)
p ft ' "o % "1p
f
t&1 % "2p
r
t % "3(qx /qr) % "4(qo /qr) % "5(w) % et , (19)
Rather, suppose FOB prices change only a proportion of the way towards equilibrium
during any given period, t.  This slow adjustment could be due to costs of adjusting prices, lags in
moving information through the system, or a conscious realization on the part of retailers that it is
in their interests to raise their selling prices before paying growers a higher price for their apples. 
Simplifying the right-side of (17) as Mt , let  If prices adjust a proportion, 8, towardsp
f(
t ' $Mt .
this amount each period, then (17) becomes:
where et is a random error in adjusting the farm price.  Writing this conceptual model as a linear
function of the variables available to this study provides a means of estimating the price-
transmission elasticity.  The estimated econometric model is, therefore, written as:
and estimated for each market using independent instrumental-variable regressions as described
below.  The following section describes the data and specific methods used in estimating both the
demand model and this price linkage specification. 
Data and Methods
The data used in this analysis were drawn from a variety of sources made available by the WAC,
including the Market Vu, Ad Activity, and Unloads reports, from September 1995 to May 1997
on a weekly basis.  These reports contains data on prices, promotion activities, and shipments to a
large number of markets, respectively.  In order to make the analysis tractable, the study focuses
on a set of sample markets consisting of Charlotte, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, Philadelphia,
Phoenix, Richmond, San Antonio, San Francisco, Seattle, St. Louis, Tampa, and Washington,
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D.C.  Because of the geographic dispersion of these markets, the retail price data exhibit
considerable variability.
In fact, pooling variety-specific data over time and markets means that prices vary by city,
week, and variety.  The Market Vu data not only satisfy this requirement, but also provide price
data on apple grade, size, container, source, and quality, as measured by a subjective scale
developed by WAC field staff.  In order to define a “standard” apple of each variety in each
market and in each week, a hedonic price-correction method adjusts for all other effects on price
(Goldman and Grossman; Cox and Wohlgenant).   Because the shipment data from the Unloads
report are defined on a zip code basis, market definitions corresponding to those used in the
Market Vu reports are found by aggregating over all contiguous zip codes within a market area. 
Details on this aggregation process are available from the authors.  These markets, in turn,
correspond closely to those used by WAC marketing officials in allocating promotional and
advertising budgets across different regions.  
Budgeted amounts for all retail promotion activities are provided by the WAC Retail
Marketing Department.  The budget reports contain lines for each retail account, defined by store
and market, and specify periods over which the activity may occur.  Another data source, the Ad
Activity Report, prepared by Leemis Market Research, reports the gross rating points (GRPs) for
Fujis and all other Washington apple variety advertisements.  GRPs for each retail account and
budget period are used as weighting factors in allocating budget expenditures over time to either
Fuji apples or all other varieties.  These data are augmented by mass media expenditure data
prepared for the WAC by McCann-Erickson.  These sources provide data series for both total
Fuji promotion expenditures and for expenditures on all other apples.
These price, quantity, and promotion data are used in both a variety-level demand model,
and aggregated for use in the first-stage, or category-level demand model.  For purposes of the
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category-level model, the Washington apple price variable is a Stone’s price index calculated over
all varieties.  An average price for apples from all other sources is calculated from the Market Vu
reports on a market-by-market basis.  Prices for alternative fruits (bananas, grapes, and fresh
navel oranges) are taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Consumer Price Index:
Average Price database, while regional CPI values are from BLS C nsumer Price Index: State
and Area data.  This index is used as a proxy for the price of “all other consumption goods” in the
first-stage model.  Personal disposable income is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional
Programs data, while population values are from the Bureau of Census State Population
Estimates. 
In estimating the retail-farm price transmission elasticity, marketing costs are measured by
the price of No. 2 diesel fuel, taken from Monthly Energy Review, and the wage rate for
production workers in SIC 21 (food and kindred products) taken from Employment and
Earnings.  The FOB price are from the Washington Growers’ Clearing House.  With these data,
estimates of the price transmission elasticity are found for each market using independent, single-
equation regressions.   Because of the endogeneity of several explanatory variables in (18), these
equations are estimated using an instrumental variables procedure, where the set of instruments
includes all exogenous variables and lagged values of all endogenous variables.  Estimating the
LES/LAIDS demand model employs an iterative algorithm described by Anderson (1979).
In estimating the demand model, Anderson’s iterative procedure ensures that the
Washington apple price index is indeed a true or “perfect” index of varietal prices.  Creating
perfect price indices is desirable because they allow the first-stage prices to reflect substitution
between goods that comprise the aggregate commodity group.  An iterative approach captures
this substitution effect because the first-stage index-weights are functions of the second-stage
parameters, and the second-stage parameters are, in turn, functions of expenditures at the first-
6 Tests of symmetry and homogeneity fail to reject the null hypothesis in both cases.  Durbin and
Watson’s d  test fails to reject the null hypotheses of no positive nor negative autocorrelation for all share
equations.
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stage.   Anderson’s procedure begins by estimating the first-stage LES model.  This model
provides a fitted expenditure value for all Washington apples.  Estimates of the LAIDS variety-
share system are then made conditional on this fitted expenditure, deflated with a Stone’s price
index defined over all apple Washington apple varieties.  A new price index is found using fitted
share values from this second-stage model.  Substituting this price index into the first-stage LES
and reestimating provides a new predicted expenditure value.  Substituting this new expenditure
amount into the LAIDS model and reestimating yields updated variety-weights and a new price
index.  Continuing this procedure until the sum of the first- and second-stage log-likelihood
function values does not differ by more than 0.0001 indicates convergence.  Because the first
stage consists of only Fuji expenditures, the LES estimates are obtained using single-equation
non-linear least squares, while iterative seemingly unrelated least squares (ITSUR) provides
estimates of the full LAIDS variety-share system.  As Barten demonstrates, the resulting ITSUR
estimates are equivalent to maximum likelihood estimates and are, therefore, invariant to the
equation that is excluded, provided there is no autocorrelation present.  To maintain consistency
with constrained consumer budgeting, both homogeneity and symmetry are imposed on the
second-stage LAIDS model.6   Within the second-stage model, however, there remains some
question as to the specification of the weighting scheme used to construct a stock of consumer
goodwill created through promotion.
Cox reviews the various methods used to model the dynamics of promoting farm
commodities.  These consist of various distributed lag methods, including Pascal lags, geometric
lags, polynomial lags, or simple linear weighting schemes.  For this paper, linear or geometric
processes are inappropriate given empirical evidence showing that the response to promotion
7 Under all scenarios, the export demand elasticity is held constant at -1.0.  This is consistent with
estimates reported by Richards, Van Ispelen, and Kagan. 
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peaks some time after its introduction, and then decays slowly until a new ad is released (Little,
Feichtinger et al).  Although Pascal and polynomial lags can generate this structure, Cox develops
a parsimonious quadratic exponential lag model, which has been recently applied to study meat
promotion by Brester and Schroeder.  This study uses endpoint restrictions similar to Cox in
order to keep the specification as simple as possible, but arbitrarily assumes a longer six-period
lag due to greater data frequency.  In the first-stage, a higher rate of decay is expected as there is
greater competition for consumer attention at an aggregate level -- apple knowledge is likely only
a small part of a consumer’s entire stock.  Therefore, promotion enters the LES model as a three-
period moving average of past expenditures.  Given each of these considerations, the elasticity
estimates from this model are used to determine the net effect of promotion and cumulative
consumption on Fuji prices, allowing for feedback effects through other apple varieties.
Because changes in producer surplus are likely to be affected by these elasticity estimates,
and other parameters in the simulation model (6), alternative results are obtained and reported for
higher and lower values of: the grower share of the retail dollar, the elasticity of supply from
apple shippers, and the retail elasticity of demand.7  B cause growers and WAC officials alike are
interested in the effectiveness of the “Year of the Fuji” campaign in particular, simulations for
each parameter regime are conducted for the entire sample and for only the 1997 observations. 
Further, these simulations compare the relative contribution of each source of knowledge in
increasing demand by conducting experiments where: (1) cumulative consumption and total WAC
promotion are held constant, and Fuji-specific promotion is increased by 10%; (2) cumulative
consumption and Fuji-specific promotion are held constant and total WAC promotion is increased
by 10%; (3) both types of promotion are held constant and cumulative consumption rises by 10%;
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and (4) total WAC promotion is held constant while both Fuji-specific promotion and cumulative
consumption are increased by 10%.  The results of each scenario are compared on the basis of
increment to producer surplus and, for the promotion variables, the benefit-to-cost ratio of
investing in promotion.  The next section presents these results after a brief discussion of the
structural demand and price-linkage estimates.
Results and Discussion
Although the key results of this paper concern the calculated returns to Fuji apple growers’
promotion investments, the structural demand and FOB-price linkage parameters are themselves
of considerable interest.  In particular, the first-stage demand parameters show how all
Washington apples respond to changes in income, competing good prices, and total apple
promotion expenditure, while estimates of the second-stage parameters show how apple varieties
respond to varietial prices, total apple expenditures, and promotional expenditures.
Table 1 shows the elasticity estimates from stage one.  These results imply an own-price
elasticity for Washington apples of -0.0898 and an income elasticity of demand of 0.0139,
suggesting that apples are staples, or habitually-purchased items that respond very little to
changes in price or income.  Price-inelastic demand is perhaps to be expected from a good with a
small budget share, but the complementarity with bananas and grapes is somewhat surprising.  
This may reflect a common retailer practice of positioning bananas and grapes in the produce
section so as to increase traffic past high-margin items such as apples (The P cker).  Of greater
concern to this study, however, is the effect of aggregate WAC promotion on the Washington
apple category.  Table 1 shows that the elasticity of all Washington apples with respect to all-
promotion is 0.0390, suggesting that WAC promotion does indeed increase Washington apple
sales in aggregate, irrespective of its individual variety effects.
-21-
[table one in here]
These variety effects are estimated in the second-stage LAIDS model.  Combining
elasticities from the LES model with the variety-specific results obtained for the second-stage
model provides “total” price, expenditure, and promotion elasticities.  Elasticities obtained at this
stage are of particular concern because they indicate the likely scope for cannibalistic promotion
effects - whether advertising or price-promotion simply reallocates demand among varieties, or
expands overall demand.  In terms of own-price elasticity, the results in table 2 show that all
varieties are inelastic in demand, except for Fujis.  Two other varieties, Jonagolds and Romes,
also have relatively low price-elasticities, suggesting that specialty varieties tend to be less elastic
in demand.  In fact, specialty apples also tend to have expenditure elasticities greater than one,
lending further evidence to the contention that they are luxury goods.  In terms of cross-price
elasticities, only Braeburns are significant Fuji-substitutes, while Reds appear to be
complementary.  Therefore, higher (but opposing) spillover responses to Fuji promotion are
expected for these two varieties.  
In fact, Braeburns have the second-strongest response to Fuji promotion next to Fujis
themselves.  Significantly, none of the cross-promotion effects are negative when both aggregate
and share-effects are taken into account, indicating that Fuji-specific promotion does not
cannibalize net sales of other varieties.  Reds, however, respond very little to either Fuji
promotion, or to total WAC promotion for that matter, while Galas, Braeburns, and Jonagolds
each have elasticities with respect to total WAC promotion greater than 0.10.  This result,
combined with the fact that Fujis are only marginally less responsive than these other specialty
types, suggests that promotion as a source of information is particularly valuable for specialty
varieties.  The dynamic response to promotion, however, appears to depend critically on the type
of promotion.
8 Both of these parameters are significantly different from zero.  The t-ratio for Fuji-specific promotion is
-8.965, while the generic promotion t-ratio is 153.550.  See Cox for a graphical presentation of the specific lag
structure implied by these estimates.
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While the quadratic-exponential lag parameter for Fuji-specific promotion is -0.875, the
equivalent estimate for generic, or total WAC promotion is 1.964.8  These results suggest that
Fuji-specific promotion causes both a larger short-term rise in Fuji consumption, and its effect
tends to be more persistent than is the case with generic promotion, which dies out within two
periods.  This result, however, does not necessarily mean that product-information is of no value,
because consumers can obtain variety-information through sources other than promotion.
In particular, although the parameter estimates are not shown, estimates of this model
support the notion that consumers’ experience with a variety is critical in his or her demand,
especially for new varieties.  In fact, if consumers either learn from their own experience, or
through the behavior of others (McFadden and Train), then it can be expected that consumers’
acquisition of variety-knowledge should favor those varieties that represent true improvements on
existing apples.  It is perhaps not surprising then to find a point-estimate of the elasticity of Red
demand with respect to cumulative Red consumption of 0.0046, while the same elasticity for Fujis
is 0.0675.  Further, while cumulative consumption is strongly statistically significant in explaining
Fuji share, the cumulative consumption of Reds is only marginally significant.  Clearly, while the
experiential nature of Fujis remains important, promotions aimed at helping consumers acquire
this information will prove most effective.  Although these results show a strong impact of both
promotion and cumulative consumption on retail-demand, the ultimate return to growers depends
upon how much of this is passed on in terms of higher FOB prices.
[table two in here]
Estimating the retail-farm price transmission model (19) for each market provides the
needed FOB-price response elasticities.  Further, although these estimates are obtained using
9 Only results from the Minneapolis market are presented for brevity’s sake.  Results for other markets do
not differ appreciably, but are available from the authors upon request.
10 Kinnucan and Forker derive retail-farm price transmission elasticities for milk that consistently exceed
1.0, claiming that the opposite case, as found here, is somewhat anomalistic.  However, Gardner’s condition for Ti
< 1.0, using his equation for the transmission elasticity is simply that ea > eb .  In e weekly data of this study, this
scenario is not only possible, but highly likely as marketing costs are largely fixed in the short-run, while
shipments from cold storage are highly elastic.
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single-equation methods for each market, several of the results shown in table 3 for Minneapolis
alone are consistent across all markets.9  First, FOB prices do not adjust instantaneously to
changes in retail demand, requiring roughly 1.5 periods before changes in the retail price are fully
reflected in FOB prices.  This result is consistent with those obtained by Powers (1995) for
iceberg lettuce, or Ward (1982) in fresh vegetables or Kinnucan and Forker for dairy products. 
Second, retail prices themselves exhibit considerable “stickiness” in that the lag-structure of FOB
prices depends upon both current retail prices and a moving average of past retail prices, again
consistent with these earlier studies.  Third, FOB prices rise with the share of Fujis that are
exported as more apples are sold into the premium market, but FOB prices fall in Fujis’ domestic
market share.  This latter effect may be due to a maturing Fuji market -- as a new variety matures
or moves through its product life-cycle it necessarily becomes less of a specialty item,
commanding less of a premium in the retail market.  As expected, FOB prices fall with marketing
wages, but, unexpectedly, FOB prices rise in fuel costs.  This result suggests that fuel costs are a
more important factor in determining apple production rather than marketing costs.  The key
result from this model, however, is the price-transmission elasticity, or the percentage change in
FOB price for a percentage change in the retail price.
Using the results in table 3, and similar estimates for other markets, the average long-run
price-transmission elasticity for Fuji apples is 0.604.10  For all other varieties, the transmission
elasticity is calculated using an expression from Gardner:
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Ti ' (Fi % eb)/[Fi % S
f
i eb % (1 & S
f
i )ea]; (20)
 where F is the elasticity of substitution between farm and marketing inputs; ea is the elasticity of
supply of farm inputs; eb is the elasticity of supply of marketing inputs; and, S
f is the farm-share of
the retail dollar.  As in Kinnucan, et al., F is ssumed to be zero, while Si
f is taken from the data. 
Unlike Kinnucan, et al., however, the values for ea and eb are 1.30 and 0.50, respectively.  These
values are chosen by fixing eb and then calibrating (20) to be consistent with the estimated Fuji
transmission elasticity.  Using these transmission elasticities, equation (6) provides estimates of
the effect of changing promotion and experience on producers’ surplus. 
[table 3 in here]
In order to test the sensitivity of changes in producer surplus to different values of the
model parameters, alternative simulations are conducted as described above.  To answer the
objectives of this paper, “grower returns” to promotion or experience are defined both in terms of
the present value increment to producer surplus and the ratio of the change in the present value of
benefits to the change in present value of costs of promoting.  The simulation results for both the
entire sample period and the “Year of the Fuji,” assuming a 5% interest rate, are shown in table 4.
[table 4 in here]
In the base scenario, a 10% rise in Fuji promotion generates a benefit:cost ratio (BC) of
14.73 for the entire sample period, but falls to 8.59 for the “Year of the Fuji” campaign.  This
reduction in returns over the later period may be due to one of many factors.  First, promotional
expenditures are likely to exhibit declining marginal returns -- beyond a minimal amount required
to establish a market presence, each additional dollar of expenditure generates a lower increment
in sales than did the previous one.  Second, by early 1997 the number of consumers who had not
yet tried Fuji apples is likely to have been very small.  If this is the case, then the ability of
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promotion to precipitate new purchases has passed and the role of advertising then becomes one
of building purchase habits instead.  Whereas promotion is necessary to establish a new product in
the market, such high rates of return associated with the rapid growth phase of a product’s life-
cycle are unlikely to be sustainable as purchases become more habitual and price-sensitive. Third,
lower retail prices may be responsible for more of the increase in Fuji consumption than in the
past.  Nonetheless, the returns to promotion are still strongly positive and many times their cost of
provision under all alternative parameter assumptions.  However, these results do appear to be
sensitive to other parameters in the simulation model.  
In particular, as expected, returns over the entire sample rises to 21.53 if growers receive
80% of the retail dollar, but falls to 12.57 if they receive only 40%.  This latter scenario could
arise if marketing costs rise significantly, if consolidation at the retail level substantially increases
apple buyers’ power to set prices, or if significant competition for retail space arises from other
regions’ apples, or even other products within the produce section.  Perhaps the most important
simulation considers different elasticities of supply from shippers.  Conducting sensitivity analysis
with this parameter is necessary because little is known of the true supply elasticity in weekly data
with significant amounts of storage.  If supply is inelastic, or nearly fixed (0.5), the return to
promotion rises to 26.71 from the base case.  In this case, any increase in demand will cause FOB
prices to rise significantly, while causing little change in quantity supplied.  On the other hand, a
supply elasticity more than double that considered in the base scenario (3.0) causes the returns to
promotion to fall to 8.66, as growers respond to higher prices by increasing the quantity supplied
more than proportionately.  However, such a supply elasticity is unlikely in the medium and long
run for an agricultural product subject to significant production lags and constraints on land,
labor, and other key inputs.  Changing the elasticity of retail demand also produces the expected
changes in returns to promotion, with variety-specific promotion becoming more effective the
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lower the elasticity of demand.  In fact, reducing the demand elasticity to levels closer to the
mature varieties provides a BC estimate of $23.05 for the next dollar invested, suggesting that this
promotion will become more profitable as the variety matures and its demand becomes less
elastic.  Qualitatively, these conclusions hold for each of the other combinations of promotion and
experience, but the net returns differ considerably.
In particular, the BC ratio for a 10% rise in total WAC promotion is less than one in the
base case, for both the entire sample and the “Year of the Fuji.”  Negative returns are due both to
the small estimated response elasticities and the sheer size of overall promotion expenditures,
again implying strong diminishing marginal returns to promoting apples.  As in the previous case,
the greatest returns are found under scenarios of high farm-retail price ratio, and a low demand or
supply elasticity.  Unlike the case for Fuji-specific promotion, however, the return to total WAC,
or generic, promotion is higher during the “Year of the Fuji” campaign than over the full sample. 
This suggests that there were greater synergies between the two types of promotion when Fujis
were being promoted aggressively.  Such synergistic effects are also apparent in comparing Fuji-
specific promotion with and without taking account of cumulative Fuji consumption.
Because promotion and learning are two alternative sources of information, there is a
potential that they may substitute for one another.  However, it may also be the case that
promotion in fact reinforces learning and vice versa.  This indeed appears to be true as the returns
to Fuji-specific promotion, when allowing for the accumulation of experiential knowledge through
consumption, are uniformly higher than when Fuji-specific promotion is considered alone.  In fact,
table 4 shows that the return to Fuji-specific promotion in this scenario may be as high as $30.21
for the next dollar invested if demand is inelastic (-0.5) or $35.51 if supply is inelastic.  The most
conservative estimate of returns arises when shipper supply is highly elastic, but still provides a
margin return of $11.28 for the next dollar of promotion.  Under the base-scenario, Fuji-specific
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promotion returns $19.27 per dollar of promotion for the entire sample, and $11.25 per dollar for
the “Year of the Fuji” campaign.   In the scenario that considers only Fuji-specific promotion,
product life cycle-stage is offered as one explanation for this difference in returns.  However, by
including the effect of cumulative consumption, this simulation takes into account any stage-of-
life-cycle effects that may exist.  Finding a significant difference in returns between the two time
periods provides more support for the argument that there are declining marginal returns to
promotion.  Although a benefit:cost ratio cannot be calculated for the effect of a rise in
cumulative consumption in isolation, it is instructive to compare changes in producer surplus that
result from a sustained increase in this experience-proxy.
Whereas a 10% increase in Fuji-specific promotion provides an additional $977,100 in
producer surplus, a similar increase in cumulative consumption generates an increase of $297,900
over the sample period, assuming the base-case parameters.  At current promotion expenditure
levels, this means that an incremental dollar expenditure on Fuji promotion leads to $14.14 of
producer surplus, while an additional dollar of consumer expenditure on Fujis causes producer
surplus to rise by only $0.14.  Although in-store samples are often used, this result suggests that
such a strategy is an inefficient way to generate new producer surplus.  One reason for the small
response to experience may be a relative lack of  learning from others for this type of product
(McFadden and Train).  If a product has a small budget share, is non-durable, is seasonal, and has
inherently variable quality characteristics, consumers will obtain very little of their knowledge
about the product from other consumers, learning instead from their own consumption.   As in the
previous cases, the increment to producer surplus from a change in cumulative consumption is
greatest when the farm share of the retail dollar is high, and elasticities of supply and demand are
low. 
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Conclusions and Implications for Future Research
In general, this study finds very high rates of return to Fuji apple growers’ promotional
investments.  Although these rates of return are superior to returns on other investments available
to growers, they are consistent with the returns to promoting other produce items (Alston, et al.). 
This study not only adds to a growing body of evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of
cooperative grower-promotion programs, but considers issues that have not been explicitly
addressed in other studies of this type.   Namely, it compares the relative effectiveness of variety-
specific promotion, generic or product-promotion, and consumer experience in generating
producer surplus.  
Returns to each of these factors are estimated with a market-simulation model of producer
surplus, incorporating demand elasticities from a two-stage LES/LAIDS model of variety
demand, and transmission elasticities taken from dynamic empirical models of the retail-FOB price
linkage.  With this model, the return to Fuji-specific promotion is uniformly positive over a variety
of parametric assumptions.  Generating almost $15.00 of producer surplus for a $1.00 investment
in promotion, such targeted expenditures appear to be a much more effective use of growers’
checkoff money than generic promotion.  In fact, generic promotion returns less than a dollar in
producer surplus for each dollar in costs to Fuji apple growers.  The highest returns are obtained
when Fuji-specific promotion and consumer experience are considered together, due the
complementary effects between learning and promotion in increasing demand.  Despite these
positive findings, some caveats and limitations must be kept in mind.
First, this study shows that the returns to Fuji promotion were lower during the intensive
“Year of the Fuji” campaign (1997) compared to the entire sample.  While benefit:cost ratios in
excess of $10.00 are common over the entire sample period, returns fall by an average of 40%
during the Fuji campaign.  Although this may be due to the fact that a “normalization” of Fuji
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prices was required in order to move a crop that was more than double the previous year’s, it may
also be due to the diminishing marginal returns of commodity promotion.  This reduction in
returns may also be simply due to the maturation of Fuji apples as a product.   Fuji apples are still
a new product to consumers, so the primary constraint to increased sales may be a lack of
experiential knowledge of Fujis’ taste, texture, and storability.  Traditional methods of promotion
can help in removing this obstacle, but are not perfect substitutes.  Consequently, promotion may
become more effective over time as consumers learn about Fujis on their own or by word of
mouth.
Second, aggregate data such as that provided by the Market Vu, Unloads, and Ad Activity
provide only approximate measures of the actual variables required to measure the return to
promotion.  These data do not contain information on differences among advertising media, nor
the total amount of exposure generated by each dollar of expenditure.  In order to better
understand the issues surrounding the effectiveness of promoting a specific variety, future
empirical research should consider the effect of specific programs on measures of consumer
awareness and consumer purchase behavior.  A greater empirical understanding of the causes of
purchase incidence, purchase frequency, and variety choice will help all commodity marketing
officials optimally allocate their promotion budgets.  
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Table 1.  LES Elasticity Estimates of Aggregate Washington Apple Demand
Variable Elasticity Estimate t-ratio
Wash. Apple Price1 -0.0898* -1.8475
Other Apple Price 0.0171 0.2831
Banana Price -1.1858* -4.7455
Grape Price -0.2433* -3.3216
Navel Orange Price 1.1684* 10.6110
Other Consumer Good Price 3.0918* 2.4155
Personal Disposable Income 0.0139* 22.9871
Total WAC Promotion 0.0390* 1.9561
 1 A single asterisk indicates the estimate is significantly different from zero with a 95% level of confidence. 
This model also included binary market variables, but are not displayed here for brevity’s sake.  Model estimates
are obtained by pooling data over twelve sample markets and eighty-eight weeks of Fuji shipments.
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Table 2.  Total Elasticities of Washington Apple Demand: Top Eight Varieties
Red1 Gold Gran. Fuji Gala Brae. Jong. Rome Exp.
Fuji
 Promo.
All WAC 
Promo.
Cumulative
Consum.
Red -0.126*
(-3.403)
0.274*
(11.003)
0.410*
(22.791)
0.463*
(23.151)
0.468*
(25.625)
0.461*
(35.597)
0.483*
(43.737)
0.475*
(44.407)
0.884*
(49.685)
0.019*
(8.461)
0.025*
(12.403)
0.005
(0.737)
Gold -0.442*
(-6.270)
-0.055
(-0.332)
-0.061
(-0.635)
0.279*
(3.259)
0.062
(0.599)
0.204*
(3.671)
0.278*
(8.314)
0.190*
(5.678)
1.034*
(28.897)
0.033*
(7.529)
0.046*
(14.053)
0.002
(0.124)
Gran. -0.452*
(-3.160)
-0.701*
(-2.379)
-0.160
(-0.528)
0.129
(0.658)
0.459*
(1.988)
0.304*
(2.442)
0.054
(0.668)
-0.040
(-0.442)
0.822*
(11.640)
0.036*
(4.246)
0.019*
(3.142)
-0.061*
(-1.929)
Fuji -0.506*
(-2.334)
0.277
(0.769)
0.126
(0.463)
-1.266*
(-3.517)
0.113
(0.409)
0.286*
(1.717)
-0.004
(-0.045)
-0.089
(-0.846)
1.681*
(15.024)
0.228*
(16.095)
0.065*
(7.261)
0.068*
(4.191)
Gala -0.114
(-0.624)
-0.474
(-1.218)
0.540*
(1.896)
0.117
(0.473)
-0.134*
(-3.386)
-0.661*
(-4.103)
-0.203*
(-2.112)
0.296*
(2.700)
1.071*
(11.031)
0.074*
(5.903)
0.150*
(7.606)
-0.114*
(-3.506)
Brae. -0.875*
(-3.638)
-0.110
(-0.248)
0.622*
(1.920)
0.426
(1.363)
-1.500*
(-4.438)
-0.160
(-0.548)
-0.283*
(-2.479)
0.294*
(2.488)
1.973*
(13.954)
0.109*
(6.164)
0.110*
(8.526)
0.059*
(1.886)
Jong. 0.108
(0.384)
1.330*
(2.300)
-0.015
(-0.031)
-0.322
(-0.771)
-1.236*
(-2.715)
-0.727*
(-2.796)
-0.523*
(-2.028)
0.052
(0.214)
1.457*
(9.450)
0.064*
(3.215)
0.136*
(7.981)
0.071
(1.150)
Rome -0.059
(-0.269)
0.933*
(1.876)
-0.787*
(-1.862)
-0.429
(-1.326)
-0.243
(-0.610)
0.209
(0.953)
0.178
(0.809)
-0.976*
(-4.666)
1.284*
(10.483)
0.019
(1.266)
0.065
(6.132)
0.062*
(8.154)
 1 A single asterisk indicates the estimate is significantly different from zero with a 95% level of confidence. 
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Table 3.  Retail-FOB Price Linkage Equation: Minneapolis Market.
Variable Estimate t-ratio Variable Estimate t-ratio
0.497* 6.332P ft&1 Wages -0.494* -4.475
P r 0.174* 1.815 Exp. Share 0.146* 3.269
P rt&1 -0.252* -3.620 Dom. Share -0.815* -2.007
Fuel 0.852* 3.878 Constant 5.309* 4.693
R2 0.814
A single asterisk indicates the parameter is significantly different from zero with 95%level of confidence.  The
variables in this table are defined as follows: Pft-1 is the FOB price, lagged by one week; Pr is the retail price;
Exp. Share is the share of Fujis that are exported; Dom. Share is the percentage of all Washington apples
shipped that are Fujis.
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Table 4. Grower Returns to Fuji and WAC Promotion Expenditure: November 1995 - May 1997
Fuji Promo All WAC Promo Fuji Cumulative Fuji Promo &
Cumulative
Entire
Sample
Year of
the Fuji
Entire
Sample
Year of
the Fuji
Entire
Sample
Year of
the Fuji
Entire
Sample
Year of
the Fuji
Change in Producer Surplus
Base Case1 977.1 567.7 339.8 197.4 297.9 173.1 1,279.1 743.2
High Farm Share 1,428.7 830.1 496.9 288.7 435.7 253.1 1,870.4 1,086.8
Low Farm Share 714.3 415.1 248.5 144.4 217.8 126.6 935.2 543.4
High Supply
Elasticity
574.3 333.7 125.3 72.8 170.8 99.3 748.4 434.8
Low Supply
Elasticity
1,772.3 1,029.7 430.2 249.9 578.1 335.9 2,355.9 1,368.9
High Demand
Elasticity
617.7 358.9 215.2 125.0 188.7 109.6 808.0 469.5
Low Demand
Elasticity
1,529.2 888.5 530.5 308.3 465.1 270.2 2,004.4 1,164.6
Benefit/Cost Ratio
Base Case 14.73 8.59 0.23 0.37 N.A. N.A. 19.27 11.25
High Farm Share 21.53 12.57 0.34 0.55 N.A. N.A. 28.19 16.46
Low Farm Share 10.77 6.28 0.17 0.27 N.A. N.A. 14.10 8.22
High Supply
Elasticity
8.66 5.05 0.09 0.14 N.A. N.A. 11.28 6.58
Low Supply
Elasticity
26.71 15.59 0.29 0.47 N.A. N.A. 35.51 20.73
High Demand
Elasticity
9.31 5.43 0.15 0.24 N.A. N.A. 12.18 7.11
Low Demand
Elasticity
23.05 13.45 0.36 0.58 N.A. N.A. 30.21 17.63
   1 In this table: Base Farm Share = 0.547, High Farm Share = 0.80, Low Farm Share = 0.40; Base Supply
Elasticity = 1.30, High Supply Elasticity = 3.0, Low Supply Elasticity = 0.5; Base Demand Elasticity = -1.266,
High Demand Elasticity = -2.5, Low Demand Elasticity = -0.5. N.A. means that the measure is not applicable.
